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Historical Antecedents and Post-WWII 
Regionalism in the Americas 
By TOM LONG* 
Introduction 
After the Second World War disrupted global and regional security orders, new U.S.-led 
regional security arrangements emerged with varying institutional forms. The multilateral 
security institutions that took shape in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contrasted 
with the bilateral pacts that connected the United States and its Asian allies.1 
Multilateral security and political institutions also emerged in the Western Hemisphere 
after the war—particularly the Rio Treaty and Organization of American States. 
However, debates about the institutional forms of postwar regional security orders have 
overlooked this contemporaneous case. This is more than an empirical oversight. 
Theoretical frameworks that emphasize external threat, burden-sharing, and shared 
identity as jointly necessary for the emergence of multilateral regional security 
institutions do not explain the inter-American case.  
 
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at University of Oxford, University College London, 
Universidad de los Andes, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile, and at annual conventions of the International Studies Association, Latin American 
Studies Association, and Swiss Political Science Association. Thanks to the participants in those 
discussions, to three anonymous reviewers and the editors of World Politics, and to Christopher Hemmer, 
Louise Fawcett, Max Paul Friedman, Giovanni Mantilla, Galia Press-Barnathan, Martin Binder, Maria 
Koinova, Vincenzo Bove, and Carsten-Andreas Schulz for helpful comments. Research for this paper was 
conducted under grants from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, Truman Library Institute, and 
Fulbright U.S. Scholars Program. 
1 Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002.  
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The post-WWII inter-American system centered on a collective defense treaty after 
1947 and a strengthened, multi-purpose multilateral organization after 1948. These 
regional institutions were shaped by power asymmetries, but they also ensconced 
norms of sovereign equality and nonintervention. At the time of their creation, most Latin 
American leaders saw them as way to gain greater voice through multilateral decision-
making and to create institutional and legal constraints on U.S. unilateralism. Historical 
and IR scholarship largely treats postwar inter-American institutions as a continuation of 
hegemonic or imperial leadership. Our empirical examination contests that interpretation 
and uncovers two important aspects of the period. First, the continuation (indeed, 
expansion) of inter-American institutions was far from certain given disagreements 
among U.S. policymakers, who variously favored new global arrangements, a renewed 
inter-American system, or the preservation of unilateral prerogative. Secondly, the new 
inter-American system was not a U.S. imposition. Instead, crucial support and impetus 
for multilateral inter-American security institutions originated with Latin Americans who 
wanted to expand, build upon, and repurpose prewar regional institutions in the context 
of a nascent global order. Though U.S. power and interventionism figured among Latin 
American concerns, they also sought to institutionalize engagement, voice 
opportunities, restraint, and rules-based order with the United States and one another. 
The postwar multilateral security architecture emerged as a grand bargain that 
institutionalized and extended U.S. influence while recognizing Latin American 
demands. 
This case does not conform to prominent explanations for the emergence of multilateral 
regional security institutions. Drawing on multinational archival evidence and an 
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historical institutionalist framework, we show how shared historical antecedents of 
regionalism shaped the emergence of multilateral security institutions. In the Americas, 
these included a legacy of Pan-American cooperation, designs, and practices, which 
were situated in juridical, normative, and diplomatic traditions partially shared among 
the United States and Latin American republics. In the North Atlantic, too, historical 
antecedents—wartime cooperation, inter-war negotiations, histories of arbitration, and 
earlier proposals for North Atlantic cooperation—prefigured NATO’s multilateral regional 
security institutions.2 The paucity of such antecedents spanning the Pacific corresponds 
with the absence of security multilateralism, namely the failure of the Pacific Pact, and 
subsequent reliance on bilateralism.3 Our argument contributes to broader debates 
about international institutional creation and design by showing how, in critical junctures, 
antecedents shape actors’ choices and facilitate processes of layering and conversion. 
These conceptual tools, adapted from historical institutionalism, improve IR’s accounts 
of how history matters for the development of regional institutions by distinguishing 
antecedents from identity and illuminating processes of institutional creation and 
change. By employing underutilized Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, and Mexican foreign 
ministry archives, alongside records from the Department of State and Truman 
Presidential Library, we make an empirical contribution on postwar inter-American 
relations, while extending emerging research on Latin American contributions to norms, 
practices, and institutions of global governance into the security realm.4  
 
2 Roberts 1997; Baylis 1993. 
3 The Pacific Pact’s failure in 1949, as Press-Barnathan 2004 notes, offers a better synchronous 
comparison with NATO than SEATO. 
4 For example, Helleiner 2014, discusses contributions to Bretton Woods; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014 
and Schulz 2017 discuss diplomatic contributions at The Hague; Sikkink 2014 and Long and Friedman 
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The article continues as follows. The next section outlines the debate over the 
emergence and divergent forms of postwar security orders. After showing that leading 
explanations provide little purchase on the inter-American case, we advance an 
alternative explanation based in historical institutionalism. Our case examines the 
formation of postwar inter-American security institutions in depth. We conclude with a 
brief comparison of the post-WWII cases to demonstrate how antecedents help explain 
institutional variation in U.S.-led security regionalism. 
Orders and regions 
Though the U.S.-led, post-World War II international order is often characterized as 
multilateral, substantial variation in regional security arrangements existed from the 
start. IR scholars offer numerous explanations for variations in institutional emergence 
and form. Supply-side explanations typically treat hegemons or “pivotal states” as 
security providers,5 which act for systemic reasons or due to the internationalist 
interests of governing coalitions.6 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll point to the leading 
power’s capability, role, and orientation as determinants of regional order.7 Pedersen 
labels West German postwar strategies “cooperative hegemony,” emphasizing leading 
powers’ role in fostering regional orders.8 Conversely, explanations of the regional 
“demand side” focus on common external and domestic threats and negative security 
 
2019 explore contributions to human rights and democracy protection regimes; Long 2018 discusses 
Latin America in debates on liberal international order. 
5 For a recent overview, see Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016, 300–306.  
6 Solingen 1998.  
7  Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010. 
8 Pedersen 2002 emphasizes a declining power’s incentives to build more cooperative rule. Ikenberry’s 
emphasis on attempts to create stable order at a moment of exceptional power is more fitting here. See 
also Hurrell 1995. 
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externalities.9 In comparative regionalism, Acharya and Johnston emphasize power 
distributions, cooperation problems, identity, and regime-type heterogeneity to explain 
distinctive regional institutional designs. Kahler and MacIntyre emphasize spillover and 
feedback effects in generating support from economic interests for regional 
integration.10  
Within the literature on security regionalism, one prominent debate compares the 
emergence of multilateral security institutions in NATO with their absence in Asia.11 
However, the “Why is there no NATO in Asia?” debate has overlooked the inter-
American experience during the same juncture.12 From 1944-48, Western Hemisphere 
states conceived, negotiated, and implemented a collective security pact and 
multifaceted, multilateral organization. The contemporaneous inter-American case—
slightly predating NATO—allows for a strong test of existing explanations for the 
emergence of multilateral security institutions. 
Hemmer and Katzenstein effectively treat the emergence of multilateral security 
institutions as dichotomous: the North Atlantic developed multilateral security 
governance while Asia did not. Though North Atlantic and inter-American security 
arrangements differed in important respects, both regional systems fit prominent 
definitions of multilateralism, including the conceptualization employed by Hemmer and 
Katztenstein. For Keohane, multilateralism is essentially coordination among three or 
 
9 Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016, 300–306. 
10 Acharya and Johnston 2007; Kahler and MacIntyre 2013.  
11 Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Press-Barnathan 2004; He and Feng 2011. 
12 Acharya 2005 notes that Latin America developed collective defense with the United States despite 
power disparities and legalistic norms of nonintervention, but does not explore the case. 
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more states.13 Ruggie invoked a “qualitative dimension” in which coordination occurs 
“on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states.”14 For 
security multilateralism specifically, Ruggie emphasized “some expression or other of 
collective security or collective self-defense.”15 For both scholars, multilateral institutions 
can be global or regional in scope; Ruggie further stresses that principles of conduct 
apply generally among member-states. NATO and the inter-American system had 
important similarities, starting with their founding texts: the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (known as the Rio Treaty) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
of 1949. Both created regional collective security guarantees based on the principle that 
“an attack on one is an attack on all,” with mandatory mechanisms for multilateral 
consultation. Both drew juridical legitimacy from UN Charter Article 51 on regional 
collective defense, have mechanisms for referral to the UN Security Council, and  
specify the creation of an organization for executing these functions.16 These similarities 
contrast with the failed Pacific Pact and, later, SEATO, which lacked a collective 
defense clause and retained unilateral and bilateral decision-making.17 Though one 
might object that the United States was an extra-regional power in Asia and Europe 
while it was part of the Americas, Hemmer and Katzenstein (building on Ruggie) 
emphasize the mutability of regions and the construction of a “North Atlantic” region that 
included the United States and Canada. While the U.S. exercised longstanding 
predominance around the Caribbean, it is doubtful that its influence or interests were 
 
13 Keohane 1990.  
14 Ruggie 1992, 567. 
15 Ruggie 1992, 566.  
16 These are called “the Council” in the North Atlantic Treaty and the “Organ of Consultation” in the Rio 
Treaty, which preceded the creation of the OAS, and therefore refers provisionally to the Pan American 
Union’s Governing Board or meetings of Foreign Ministers. 
17 Hemmer and Katzenstein, 578-79. 
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deeper in South America in the late 1940s than in Europe or Asia, where it had fought 
wars, held massive debts, and garrisoned hundreds of thousands of troops. 
Still, the inter-American system and NATO emerged with important differences, which 
grew over time. In contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty emphasizes 
peaceful resolution of disputes among signatories and explicitly considers the possibility 
of intraregional conflicts. It is more specific about decision-making procedures and 
juridical precedents, with implicit reference to nonintervention and sovereign equality.18 
More important than initial textual differences was how the arrangements evolved in 
their first years. Following hemisphere-wide consultation in 1945, the American states 
approved a collective security compact in 1947, which was complemented the following 
year by a reinvigorated regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS). The 
OAS was created to oversees a range of functions beyond defense—quite different than 
the North Atlantic Council—and it functioned through contentious voting instead of 
consensus and unanimity.19 Inter-American military coordination—centered on the Inter-
American Defense Board, a wartime holdover—was far less centralized than in 
Europe.20 Proposals for an integrated command structure faltered. In contrast, NATO 
evolved greater military command integration and centralization than was first 
envisioned, spurred by the Soviet nuclear test, Berlin blockade, and the Korean War. 
Functioning on a permanent basis after mid-1950, the North Atlantic Council 
coordinated larger resource and troop commitments; postwar military aid in the 
 
18 These terms do not appear in the treaty text, but are prominent in contemporaneous inter-American 
agreements. 
19 The text of the Rio Treaty is available at https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html; the 
North Atlantic Treaty is available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.  
20 Rabe 1974, 133. 
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Americas was minimal and bilateral.21 NATO developed into an operationalized military 
alliance with a centralized headquarters; the Rio Treaty did not.  
What explains the variation in institutional forms emerging from the postwar juncture?  
In comparing NATO and Asia, Hemmer and Katzenstein discount several U.S.-centric 
“universal and indeterminate explanations.” Ruggie argued that multilateralism is how 
U.S. leaders enacted a particularly American hegemony,22 but this cannot account for 
multilateralism’s failure to emerge in Asia. Though congruent with multilateralism in the 
Americas, the explanation fails against the details of the case.23 Explanations 
concerning U.S. beliefs, Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, and, alternatively, neighbors’ 
fears of resurgent enemies are all “underdetermined.” Nor do they explain the Americas. 
Instead, Hemmer and Katzenstein advance an “eclectic explanation” focused on 
“power, threats, and identity.” Their framework remains especially useful for examining 
the broader literature on the emergence of regional security orders,24 because it 
captures liberal arguments about institutional efficiency, realist arguments about 
responses to threats, and constructivist arguments about identity.  
Their first condition concerns the presence of cooperative great powers who help 
shoulder security burdens: the United States shares authority if it expects lower costs. 
Similarly, Press-Barnathan hypothesizes that multilateralism is more likely if power 
disparities between the U.S. and regional partners are moderate and “power disparities 
 
21 On NATO, see Krieger 1992, 121; Schwabe 1992; Cook 1989, 222-250. Cook emphasizes French and 
British pressures in May-July 1950 for spurring a permanent NATO council. On arms transfers in Latin 
America, see Rabe 1974. 
22 Ruggie, 593. 
23 Tillapaugh 1978; Trask 1977; Garcia 2012.  
24 Krahmann 2003 highlights “balance-of-power theory, security regimes and security communities” as the 
three leading schools of thought on regional security. 
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among the regional partners are low.”25 Though neither Europe nor Asia could offset 
costs immediately after the war, U.S. policymakers viewed several European states as 
once-and-future great powers. In Asia, this applied only to Japan. As such, great-power 
status helps account for U.S. multilateralism in Europe versus bilateralism in Asia.26 
However, U.S. policymakers doubted any Latin American country would be a great 
power. U.S. pessimism about Latin America’s great-power potential and burden-sharing 
capacity contrasts with the creation of inter-American multilateral security institutions. 
Press-Barnathan’s emphasis on regional commitment to cooperation, as opposed to 
material capacity, fares better against the inter-American case—though it is ambiguous 
in Asia given divided preferences between Japan and its neighbors.27  
The second group of explanations focuses on external threats. Realist accounts often 
argue that “a regional power assumes the burden of defending the area from external 
security threats.”28 According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, higher and qualitatively 
different threat perceptions in Europe help explain why multilateralism emerged there 
and not in Asia. (Counterintuitively, a war in Asia [Korea] spurred deeper multilateralism 
in NATO’s first years, while failing to do so in Asia itself.29) Even in Europe, however, 
there is no “direct line from a certain type of threat (cross-border Soviet attack) to a 
particular institutional form (multilateralism).”30 He and Feng add that U.S. policymakers 
respond to higher levels of threat—loss in prospect theory terms—by accepting greater 
 
25 Press-Barnathan 29-30. 
26 Hemmer and Katzenstein, 584 
27 Press-Barnathan, esp. 29-31. 
28 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 742. 
29 Hemmer and Katzenstein, 585-86; Cook 1989.  
30 Hemmer and Katzenstein, 585. 
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risk via multilateralism.31 Again, the inter-American case complicates these 
explanations. U.S. policymakers perceived little threat from, within, or to Latin America 
in the immediate postwar period. Though threats in the Americas in 1945-1948 rank as 
the lowest of the three cases, multilateral security institutions were constructed—defying 
He and Feng’s explanation. U.S. leaders desired Latin American cooperation—
particularly access to raw materials and strategic territory—in any future conflict, but this 
goal responded to recent wartime experiences, not to perceptions of an imminent threat 
to the region.  
The third group of explanations emphasizes “perceptions of collective identity,” in 
Hemmer and Katzenstein’s terms. U.S. and European policymakers understood 
themselves as comprising a common Western, Christian civilization, which meant “the 
Europeans could be trusted with the additional power a multilateral institution would give 
them.”32 U.S. prejudice against Asians sank attempts to replicate NATO there.33 
Southeast Asia was seen first through a colonial, and then, a Cold War lens. Strategic 
rationales were offered for the failed Pacific Pact and the 1954 creation of SEATO, but 
civilizational affinities were conspicuous by their absence.  
However, identity offers little purchase for explaining postwar inter-American multilateral 
security institutions. Racial biases characterized U.S. views of Latin Americans, as they 
did for U.S. views of Asians. Although Latin American statesmen, often descendants of 
Europeans, used language of “Christian civilization,” many U.S. policymakers viewed 
Latin Americans as racially inferior and childlike, a view infamously encapsulated in 
 
31 He and Feng 2011.   
32 Hemmer and Katzenstein, 588. 
33 Ibid., 575. 
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George Kennan’s 1950 report on his Latin America tour.34 These views were not 
universal in the State Department; Kennan was not a Latin Americanist and many in 
that division had greater appreciation of the countries to which they were assigned. 
Racial and cultural prejudice contrasted with a “Western Hemisphere idea” that 
identified the Americas as a “new world” of republics that interacted according to 
different principles.35 However, condescending paternalism dominated U.S. 
policymaking from Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine through the 
Wilsonian emphasis on “teaching” Latin Americans proper political culture, justifying 
numerous U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean in the decades before Franklin 
Roosevelt’s election.36 Shedding light on the effects of this racial prejudice is a core 
facet of two decades of “revisionist synthesis” in historical scholarship on U.S.-Latin 
American relations.37 It surfaces in archival records in the postwar period, too. Latin 
Americans were rarely treated as full members of the Western civilization that, for U.S. 
policymakers, united the North Atlantic.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The causes highlighted in the “no NATO” debate were strikingly absent in the Americas 
(Table 1), making it puzzling that multilateral security institutions emerged there. 
Instead, we argue, shared historical antecedents of regionalism played a key role in the 
 
34 Kennan wrote: “It seems to me unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature 
and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the 
conduct of human life than in Latin America.” He added, “the extensive intermarriage of all these 
elements [Spaniards, indigenous, and African slaves], produced other unfortunate results which seemed 
to have weighed scarcely less heavily on the chances for human progress.” 
35 Scarfi and Tillman 2016; Whitaker 1965.  
36 Schoultz 1998; McPherson 2014.  
37 Gilderhus 1992; Schoultz 1998, 2018. 
12 
 
creation of these new institutions. Alone, such antecedents are not a sufficient cause; 
instead, they are one productive cause in the context of a permissive critical juncture, as 
discussed below. Despite those antecedents, there was real uncertainty about 
institutional outcomes: U.S. commitment to inter-American institutions was in doubt from 
Dumbarton Oaks to the San Francisco conference and beyond. From this contingent 
critical juncture, a collective defense treaty and multilateral organization emerged. 
External threat, burden sharing, and collective identity were not clear drivers of U.S. 
policy, nor were they the crucial rationale offered by Latin Americans, illustrating how 
antecedents favor multilateral institutions even in the absence of other commonly 
emphasized conditions. Diplomats and policymakers returned to the importance of 
prewar antecedents to build multilateral institutions. 
Historical trajectories and regional orders 
One study of institutional gestation in the Americas concludes, “Legacies matter.”38 
Indeed, many accounts of regional institutional formation—beyond the Americas, the 
postwar juncture, and security—acknowledge the importance of history, but in 
idiosyncratic ways that sometimes overlap with identity. For example, comparative 
regionalists Acharya and Johnston mention two types of historical influence on 
institutional design: historical memory and path dependence.39 Both are forces for 
continuity. Historical memory is closely related to identity, evinced in suggestions of an 
“ASEAN way,” that favors certain institutional forms.40 To these, one could add 
 
38 Dominguez 2007, 127. 
39 Acharya and Johnston 2007, 21. 
40 Khong and Nesadurai 2007. 
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gradualism and accretion, in which institutional structures inexorably build over time. 
Kahler and MacIntyre compare this to “crude diagrams of the ascent of man.”41  
Building on recent developments in historical institutionalism (HI), our explanation 
advances existing treatments of history’s role in the formation of regional institutions by 
showing how certain antecedents gain causal weight in critical junctures. HI’s approach 
to explanation bridges IR’s salient rationalist-constructivist paradigmatic divide,42 which 
is also reflected in Hemmer and Katzenstein’s eclectic explanation. Our more precise 
treatment of history allows us to distinguish historical antecedents from regional 
identities, as emphasized by Hemmer and Katzenstein and IR constructivists generally. 
In the inter-American case, antecedents do not co-vary with identity and can be 
analyzed separately.  
HI was long known for an analytical model in which relative stasis is punctuated by brief 
periods of rapid institutional change.43 Scholarship initially emphasized mechanisms—
especially path dependence44—that favor institutional continuity after such critical 
junctures. In an HI account of European security institutions, Menon notes this division 
between exogenous shocks in creation moments followed by long periods of stability.45 
Though HI has developed explanations for gradual and incremental change,46 its 
accounts of rapid change continue to emphasize exogenous shocks and critical 
junctures.47 Critical junctures are defined by Capoccia and Kelemen as “relatively short 
 
41 Kahler and MacIntyre 2013. 
42 Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 2016, 199-200; Fioretos 2011. 
43 Fioretos 2017. 
44 Thelen 387-9; Fioretos, 373-83. 
45 Menon 2011, 87-88. 
46 Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015; Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 2016; Moschella and Tsingtou 2013. 
47 Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000, 476–477; Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 2016, 11. 
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periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ 
choices will affect the outcome of interest.”48 Though there is debate in HI about the 
nature of critical junctures and how to identify them, we adopt this contingency-focused 
approach because it allows scholars to examine “near misses,” of institutional creation 
or reform, counterfactuals, and choices not taken.49 Most famously, Ikenberry argued 
that following major wars, the combination of state capacities and interests shapes 
postwar orders.50 The post-WWII period is such a critical juncture, allowing for the 
comparison of three divergent regional outcomes. Divergent institutional forms are 
possible because in such critical junctures, loosened structural constraints “increase the 
causal power of agency.”51  
Secondly, we integrate Slater and Simmons’ concept of “critical antecedents” with HI 
mechanisms for incremental change that have largely been examined outside critical 
junctures.52 Critical antecedents are “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture 
that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term 
divergence in outcomes.”53 While Slater and Simmons argue these antecedents may 
affect causal mechanisms, they do not specify the types of mechanisms one might 
expect. Elsewhere, however, HI describes several mechanisms for incremental 
change—drift, conversion, layering, and exhaustion.54 We argue that similar 
 
48 Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348. 
49 Capoccia 2015. 
50 Especially Ikenberry 2001. 
51 Soifer 2012, 1575. 
52 Slater and Simmons 2010 emphasize divergence instead of contingency in identifying critical junctures. 
We bridge this disagreement by bringing in the (constrained) agency of actors in contingent critical 
junctures. Antecedents (a la Slater and Simmons) condition the range of choices, shape preferences, and 
work through causal mechanisms, but room for agency remains in how actors relate to antecedents.  
53 Slater and Simmons 2010, 889. 
54 Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Fioretos 2011 emphasizes, as do we, layering and conversion for 
international institutions.  
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mechanisms, especially layering and conversion, can function within critical junctures, 
causally connecting antecedents to later institutional development. Layering describes a 
process in which “new elements are attached to existing institutions and so gradually 
change their status and structure;” conversion refers to a transformation of existing 
institutions for new purposes.55 Slater and Simmons suggest antecedents can shape 
actors’ range of choices during critical junctures;56 we agree and add that antecedents 
shape mechanisms within critical junctures as well. The creation of regional security 
institutions during the postwar critical juncture illustrates this. Systemic wars produce 
rare opportunities for major changes in international order.57 Even then, new orders are 
not created ex nihilio. Bits may be novel, but diplomats and policymakers construct, 
through layering and conversion, new institutional structures atop shared antecedents. 
That said, antecedents do not all matter equally or produce multilateral outcomes in 
every critical juncture. As with HI generally, “individual causal factors normally must be 
analyzed as part of larger combinations,” with attention to contextual conditions and 
interactions of causal factors.58 One can consider these factors in terms of “permissive” 
and “productive causes.”59 The presence of permissive causes produces the 
contingency of a critical juncture, while productive causes lead to changes within that 
juncture. The emergence of any given multilateral institution will have multiple and 
 
55 Van der Heijden 2011; see also, Thelen 2004. Drift is less applicable because it involves relative 
institutional stasis as external conditions gradually change, creating a mismatch between institution and 
environment. Displacement emphasizes the removal of rules and their substitution; this certainly may 
occur but is best suited to examining dense institutional environments. For a summary, see Fioretos, 
Falleti, and Sheingate, 2016, 11.  
56 Slater and Simmons, 887. 
57 Ikenberry 2001. 
58 Thelen and Mahoney 2015, 7.  
59 Soifer 2012. 
16 
 
complex causes. The postwar Asian, inter-American and North Atlantic cases shared 
permissive conditions, but productive causes varied. Threat, burden-sharing, and 
common identity shaped NATO’s creation but were not necessary conditions for 
security multilateralism everywhere. Building on Ikenberry, we emphasize the 
interaction of antecedents with preference compatibility among secondary states and 
the leading state. Going beyond interest-based accounts that stress the importance of 
positive feedback for expanding institutions while treating their origins as exogenous,60 
we offer a stronger account of institutional emergence by specifying permissive 
conditions and highlighting the interaction of antecedents with other productive causes.  
Fioretos notes, “external developments, including major crises, may cause groups in 
some countries to experience preference transformations over national designs if they 
do not value historic institutions highly, while in other countries the same events may 
serve to strengthen preferences for extant designs if groups value historic institutions.” 
When actors value “historic institutions” during critical junctures, antecedents of 
regionalism make multilateral outcomes more likely; “antecedent conditions define the 
range of institutional alternatives available to decision makers [in a critical juncture] but 
do not determine the alternative chosen.”61 As Moschella and Tsingou illustrate 
regarding the 2008-09 financial crisis, antecedents may favor less radical change in 
moments of crisis.62 In other cases, the permissive conditions of the critical juncture 
facilitate the consolidation of inchoate antecedent practices and designs. For that to 
happen, antecedents must exist and be valued by agents. The nature of the 
 
60 Kahler and Macintyre 2013, 13-16. 
61 Capoccia 2015, 151, 169. 
62 Moschella and Tsingou 2013. 
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antecedents matters for institutional form. We refer to antecedents that are shared and 
of regionalism. Shared antecedents include prior events, designs, and practices that 
involved a critical mass of the actors relevant to the critical juncture. These include 
incipient cooperation among these actors, such as efforts to ameliorate regional 
conflicts through treaties or mediation, creation of mechanisms for peaceful resolution 
or arbitration of disputes, joint actions to address transnational problems, and the 
creation of venues, organizations, or networks between and beyond state actors.  
Our explanation can be tested against outcomes and processes. Strong “diagnostic 
evidence”63 would connect the presence antecedents throughout a causal chain, from 
actors’ preferences through mechanisms (layering and conversion), to the emergence 
of multilateral institutions. Evidence should show that actors base claims and 
expectations on antecedents, which may be valued because they represent previous 
investments that constrain actors’ choices and because they shape perceptions of 
future costs and benefits; layering and converting antecedents should be justified as a 
more efficient and secure solution than starting anew. As is often true in process-
tracing, the role of antecedents must be untangled from competing explanations against 
the case narrative.64 If actors respond to new threats and a new distribution of 
capabilities with new designs—unconstrained by antecedents—this would support 
rationalist explanations linked to threat and institutional efficiency. If designs are more 
shaped by shared identities and the trust these foster than by antecedents of 
 
63 Bennett and Checkel 2014, 7 
64 George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Checkel 2014, 6–9. 
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regionalism, this would support constructivist explanations. We turn to the inter-
American case to explore this further. 
The reformation of the inter-American system 
Though NATO is considered the multilateral security institution par excellence, the 1947 
Rio Treaty preceded it; in fact, the State Department cited the Rio Treaty as a model 
during NATO’s creation.65 The initial agreements impressed similar obligations upon 
their signatories, though NATO became more prominent and centralized, and received 
greater resources. Comparatively, IR scholarship gives little attention to inter-American 
multilateral security institutions. The prevailing historical treatment—drawn on U.S. 
sources and focused on U.S. decisions— emphasizes the solidification of U.S. 
dominance instead of institutional emergence and development.66 Regarding the 1947 
Rio Conference and 1948 Bogota Conference, Langley writes, “the United States 
generally got what it wanted; Latin Americans did not.”67 Brazilian historian Gerson 
Moura concluded that the new regional order “was no more than the juridical and 
political framework for irreversible United States hegemony over the continent.”68 
Drawing on research in Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, Mexican, and U.S. archives, we 
argue that these interpretations overstate U.S. dominance and read later Cold War 
trends backwards into the system’s creation. Despite clear U.S. material primacy and 
some Cold War concerns, the multilateral security arrangements of the late 1940s 
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reflected, imperfectly, the goals of Latin American leaders who sought to expand and 
convert pre-war antecedents into multilateral institutions for a postwar world.  
Antecedents of inter-American multilateralism 
Inter-American postwar collective security was ensconced in a multilateral system 
centered on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Organization of 
American States. This system converted and was layered over prewar institutions and 
practices including the Pan American Union (PAU) and Pan American conferences. It 
drew on earlier norms and practices of Latin American international jurisprudence, 
sovereign equality and nonintervention, and inter-American consultation, as well as the 
region’s global engagement at the 1907 Hague conference and the League of 
Nations.69 U.S. support for greater Latin American participation at The Hague emerged 
in part from connections between U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root and his Latin 
American counterparts, who emphasized affinities as fellow republics with a shared 
dedication to advancing international law.70 These antecedents emerged in the context 
of U.S. expansionism and Latin American ambivalence about U.S. power. In 1889, the 
United States established a precedent of semi-regular meetings of American foreign 
ministers and a commercial office in Washington, but interest was muted. As U.S. 
power became clear following the Spanish-American war, inter-American relations 
gained salience. In the early twentieth century, U.S. occupations and intervention 
sparked local resistance that enjoyed regional sympathies.71 Latin American diplomats 
sought prohibitions on intervention, an end to gunboat diplomacy, and recognition of 
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sovereign equality.72 Intellectuals including Cuban José Martí and Nicaraguan Rubén 
Darío rejected U.S. pretensions to leadership.73 However, opposition was far from 
uniform, and many Latin Americans envisaged benefits of cooperation with a more 
restrained northern colossus. This tension shaped early regional practices, including 
eight Pan American Conferences between 1889 and 1938; the PAU; joint mediation of 
conflicts, including the “ABC mediation” between the U.S. and Mexico in 1914; the 1933 
Anti-War treaty in South America; and influential inter-American legal networks.  
Through incremental layering and conversion, the commercial office of the 1890s 
became a multifaceted international organization, the PAU; in 1923 the American states 
agreed to appoint permanent representatives to its governing board.74 Despite strong 
U.S. influence, the PAU and conferences created customs of regional consultation. 
Through early 20th century Pan Americanism, “Latin American states sought to bind the 
United States while maintaining their own freedom of action.”75 While always somewhat 
lax, institutions became more formal and multilateral over time. A 1933 study concluded 
that the PAU acted as “an independent international administrative organ of a more or 
less permanent character based on the principle of equality of American states.”76 At 
Pan American summits, Latin American diplomats stridently questioned U.S. 
unilateralism, without renouncing the benefits of engagement. The summits drew U.S. 
presidential visits in 1928 and 1933 and spurred “binding mechanisms”77 in the form of a 
non-intervention declaration, the crown jewel of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. Though 
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disparate and fragmentary, the Pan American system allowed Latin America to consult, 
push, pressure, and sometimes oppose the United States during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Though U.S. influence grew during the first decades of the 20th century, pre-WWII U.S. 
predominance is often overstated, geographically and temporally. In South America, it 
was contested by European powers and often resisted by larger South American 
republics. Europe, including the Axis powers, provided markets and military partners 
during the inter-war period. World War II’s geostrategic and economic realities—
curtailed trans-Atlantic shipping; U.S. overseas basing, including major deployments to 
northeast Brazil; and U.S. wartime expansion—increased U.S. influence at the expense 
of Europeans far beyond what World War I had done. Inter-American diplomacy 
reflected this. In 1940, diplomats concurred that an attack by a “non-American state” 
against the Americas “shall be considered as an act of aggression.”78 Six weeks after 
the Pearl Harbor attack, the American ministers declared, “solidarity must be translated 
into facts.”79 The conference veered into internal security with restrictions on Axis 
nationals and firms.80 Latin American states were valuable supporters of Allied efforts. 
By late January 1942, most had broken relations with the Axis powers—with the 
important exceptions of Argentina and Chile. The region’s most important roles were 
economic and geostrategic. Latin America supplied critical wartime commodities at 
controlled prices: food, oil, copper, tin, bauxite, rubber. U.S. bases on Latin American 
territory were crucial for moving troops and materiel, patrolling sea lanes, and hunting 
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German U-boats. Inter-American coordination occurred through meetings of foreign 
ministers, regular diplomatic consultation, and via the PAU. This included postwar 
planning from mid-1943.81 After the war, these antecedents favored multilateral security 
institutions, though they did not guarantee them. 
The war also shaped domestic politics in many Latin America countries. 
Democratization flowered, or at least repression diminished, from roughly 1944-1947. 
As Latin American leaders shaped inter-American arrangements, they also responded 
to these internal pressures, including through a regional debate over squaring support 
for democratization with principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.82 By late 1947, 
traditional conservative and military elites were ascendant, while the left faced renewed 
repression. Democracy receded in several countries.83 However, the pre-1947 center-
left and the ensuing conservative wave both favored cooperation with the United States. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and Good Neighbor policies, alongside proclaimed Allied goals, 
resounded with Latin American democrats during the war and immediately afterwards. 
Anti-communist conservatives—especially influential militaries—also favored the United 
States. Latin American militaries had grown more invested in security regionalism 
through training and Lend-Lease transfers, creating expectations of further benefits.84 
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Governments of different domestic stripes held similar inter-American security 
preferences, especially while global Cold War tensions remained a secondary concern.   
From war to postwar: A critical juncture 
The war upended global order, creating a critical juncture in which new arrangements 
quickly took shape. Postwar planning in the United States began seriously in 1943. 
Some Latin American governments began to formulate plans for international order by 
the end of that year.85 At Bretton Woods, Latin American states pushed for 
developmentalist content that drew on New Deal and inter-American antecedents. 
Helleiner stresses how U.S.-Latin American cooperation in response to the Great 
Depression informed U.S. policymakers’ views and plans for global institutions; earlier 
cooperation, including a frustrated initiative for a regional development bank, created 
space for Latin Americans to pursue their economic priorities.86 In security and 
diplomacy, Latin Americans almost universally favored a strong postwar regional 
system embedded in international law. The U.S. government was divided about how to 
balance regional and global levels in the postwar order. Under Secretary Sumner 
Welles and Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller favored regional multilateralism, 
though their position was weakened when Welles resigned was pushed out in late 1943, 
wounded by administration infighting and the threat of personal scandal. Special 
Assistant Leo Pasvolsky and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius advocated 
predominant global security arrangements. The U.S. debate pitted advocates the 
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Monroe Doctrine, in traditional or multilateralized form, against fears that an 
autonomous inter-American system would legitimate European imperial preferences 
and Soviet claims in Eastern Europe.  
Under Pasvolsky’s guidance, the Dumbarton Oaks plan, drafted with minimal 
consultation beyond Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, threatened 
to obviate the inter-American system in favor of a dominant global body. The lack of 
consultation, and the plan itself, frustrated Latin Americans while demonstrating the 
value of a privileged, regional forum with the United States. The Brazilian ambassador, 
supported by Latin American counterparts, protested the violation of inter-American 
norms of consultation. Their demands spurred a series of briefings between Latin 
American diplomats and U.S. officials at Blair House. Shortly after the Dumbarton Oaks 
plan was circulated, Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla called for an 
international summit to consider how the new world organization envisioned at 
Dumbarton Oaks would affect “the economic unity of the [American] Continent and its 
contributions for a permanent peace in the world.”87 Padilla’s call resounded with 
established practices for hemispheric diplomatic conferences, converting that 
antecedent into a voice opportunity for Latin Americans. The U.S. agreed to the 
meeting, but sought to delay “actual changes in the structure of the inter-American 
system … [until] after the world security organization is more fully developed.”88 Still, 
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Latin Americans succeeded in scheduling the inter-American meeting before San 
Francisco to avoid a fait accompli.  
Though seen as a pro-U.S. figure, Padilla emerged as a leading regionalist in the 
Mexico City and San Francisco conclaves. The Mexican response to the Dumbarton 
Oaks draft, sent on October 31, 1944, highlighted declarations from the Seventh and 
Eighth Inter-American Conferences and inter-American jurisprudence as a foundation 
for any future world order. No antecedent was more important than inter-American non-
intervention, in which Latin America had invested much and from which it expected 
continuing benefits: “This principle, the cornerstone of the Inter-American System, 
deserves to be in the foreground among those which the New World can offer as a 
contribution of its own to the formation of the International Organization that is created.” 
Mexico sought to convert nonintervention from a negative guarantee to a positive 
principle of international organization. Mexico embedded its claims in the “same ideas” 
Roosevelt had praised earlier that month, seeking to entrap the United States in the 
president’s pro-regionalist rhetoric.89 Both strategies would eventually bear fruit.  
Brazil’s aspirations to a central, global role afflicted its policy on the conjunction of 
regional and global orders with some ambivalence. In mid-1944, Roosevelt considered 
Brazil for a permanent Security Council seat, largely to bolster geographic 
representativeness—but without consulting Brazil. Brazil harbored doubts about the 
Dumbarton Oaks plans, especially the proposed permanent-member veto. When 
Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas decided to pursue a permanent UNSC seat, the idea 
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divided the Brazilian foreign ministry. Many senior diplomats were chastened by Brazil’s 
withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1926, when Germany was given permanent 
seat and Brazil was shunned. This shaped Brazilian preferences for a multilateral 
regional system with precedence over global arrangements that privileged great 
powers. Brazil’s wartime Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha emphasized Brazil’s 
privileged role as Pan-American champion and interlocutor between the U.S. and 
Spanish America in an autonomous inter-American system.90  
The inter-American conference convened at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City in early 
1945, with the goal of shaping the blueprints for world and regional institutions. U.S. 
preparations were spearheaded by Nelson Rockefeller and Joseph Grew, whose roles 
in antecedent Pan-American cooperation laid the foundation for a cross-national, pro-
regional coalition.91 Brazil, Mexico, and most Latin American states emphasized 
preferences for a strong and relatively independent regional security system, layered 
over Pan-American institutions. In preparation for Chapultepec, Brazil’s position was 
that “the Security Council of the future world organization will never intervene, except in 
the rarest exceptions, in our hemisphere. … The decisions of the Security Council 
would be executed in the American continent by its own states.”92 The Brazilian 
proposal converted principles of non-intervention to preserve the autonomy of the inter-
American system. Non-intervention was central to what Ruggie called “principles of 
ordering relations” among states. Small states were great advocates, too: Uruguay 
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argued that the regional agenda should include “a pact for mutual guarantee of political 
independence and territorial integrity of the American nations, complemented by the 
elements that exist in that sense in American Law and their due coordination with the 
system of world security.”93 Antecedents shaped the range of choices in the postwar 
juncture and molded actors’ preferences. The great power-centrism of Dumbarton Oaks 
and Latin Americans’ uneven experiences with the League suggested that Latin 
Americans would have less influence on global decisions than at the regional level. 
Latin American proposals framed prewar regional antecedents as successes to build 
upon, linking arguments for regional precedence, nonintervention, and greater 
multilateralism.  
Chapultepec: An Inter-American Highpoint 
The meeting at Chapultepec from February 21-March 8, 1945 grew from Latin 
Americans’ concerns that the inter-American system was losing precedence as the 
postwar order took shape, in contrast with its growth during previous decades.94 Latin 
Americans argued for a rejuvenated inter-American system characterized by greater 
prominence and multilateralism. Brazil argued, perhaps wishfully, that the Dumbarton 
Oaks draft “foresees and therefore gives prestige to regional understandings, of which 
none has the prestige, constancy, organic nature, or permanent juridical content of the 
Inter-American system.” The Brazilian proposal noted the Treaty of Versailles’ reference 
to the Monroe Doctrine and “implicitly this system.” In a concrete proposal for layering, 
Brazil argued that American countries should create a Permanent Inter-American 
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Commission of foreign ministers to “oversee the good execution of the conventions, 
agreements, or treaties elaborated by various Pan-American conferences.” The 
Brazilians suggested building on and combining two existing institutions: Pan-American 
diplomatic meetings and the consultative Governing Board of the Pan American Union. 
Brazil’s proposed commission would have prerogative over inter-American matters, 
reducing UN influence and enhancing Latin American voice.95 Speaking to assembled 
delegates, Brazilian Foreign Minister Pedro Leão Velloso stressed evolutionary 
progression of the inter-American “machinery,” which stood ready to help “safeguard the 
peace and security of the world” in cooperation with the United Nations, converting 
regional agreements into a multilateral component of global order.96 Brazilian 
preferences for autonomous and multilateral regional security institutions were shaped 
by investments in past institutions and expectations of continued returns. Others shared 
this assessment. Latin American diplomats noted that the global system was an 
uncertain experiment—an allusion to the failed League of Nations—while the inter-
American system was a bona fide success. Paraguay argued “that the Pan American 
system is so real and concrete that no American State could renounce its benefits, 
which have been achieved in over fifty years of joint efforts.”97 Antecedent institutions 
had emerged gradually; now, Latin Americans argued, they should be transformed and 
expanded—not discarded in favor of new, uncertain global institutions.  
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The Act of Chapultepec, adopted by all American nations except Argentina on March 6, 
1945,98 enshrined principles that favored multilateralism: equality, non-intervention, and 
collective security. It also called for building on prior arrangements with a “treaty 
establishing procedures whereby such threats or acts may be met” by measures 
ranging from breaking diplomatic relations to economic sanctions to the “use of armed 
force to prevent or repeal aggression.”99 Decisions would be taken through the existing 
PAU governing board, converting it into a political body and raising its profile. As the 
meeting adjourned, several Latin American states “declared expressly that the Pan-
American system is compatible with the aims, purposes, and objectives of the 
Organization of the United Nations, and that, in consequence, it shall continue 
functioning autonomously.”100 The foundations of postwar multilateral security 
institutions emerged at Chapultepec as the Axis threat waned and before concerns 
about a Soviet threat in the Americas emerged. Multilateralism did not hinge on U.S. 
expectations of great power status or shared burdens; references to identity were 
situated in antecedents of Pan-Americanism. 
San Francisco: Regional visions in doubt 
If Chapultepec demonstrated inter-American agreement, San Francisco illustrated the 
postwar juncture’s contingency. Latin Americans left Chapultepec believing the United 
States would continue and expand its commitments to diplomatic consultation, non-
intervention, regional defense, and peaceful dispute settlement.101 The United States 
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expected strong Latin American support in San Francisco. The comity was quickly 
disrupted, first over Latin American insistence on including Argentina in San Francisco. 
Despite domestic discontent, the United States relented. More serious was the renewed 
clash over regional versus global predominance in security governance. U.S. advocates 
of global institutional preeminence dominated the San Francisco preparations. 
Pasvolsky’s plan granted UN dominance over regional bodies, with “the nations in the 
inter-American system obligated to seek permission and risk a veto before they could 
take any defensive action.”102 Roosevelt’s death and Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s 
illness and resignation exacerbated the uncertainty.  
The U.S. administration was divided over global versus regional security arrangements 
and whether the U.S. should multilateralize its commitments in the Western 
Hemisphere. Many U.S. defense figures wanted to preserve unilateral freedom of 
action. Secretary of War Henry Stimson complained: “the Dumbarton proposals have 
practically wiped out the unilateral character of the Monroe Doctrine and places our use 
of the Monroe Doctrine, in case of enforcement by arms, at the mercy of getting the 
assent of the Security Council to be created at San Francisco.” Stimson recognized the 
weight of Pan-American antecedents, noting that agreements from “various conferences 
with South American Republics during the past twelve years” under the Good Neighbor 
Policy “put serious obstacles in the path of the [unilateral] exercise of the Monroe 
Doctrine.”103 Gen. George Marshall and Navy Secretary James Forrestal also favored 
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reinforcing U.S. unilateral prerogatives in Latin America.104 Ultimately, U.S. attachment 
to the Monroe Doctrine provided impetus for a grand bargain with Latin America. 
Pasvolsky countered that the UNSC veto preserved the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. 
unilateral rights, making a regional clause unnecessary. He rejected Latin American 
pressures for regional security multilateralism as inimical to global order: “If we open up 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to allow for regional enforcement action on a collective 
basis, the world organization is finished.” Pasvolsky sought to escape such 
antecedents. Despite Chapultepec, the U.S. was “not now obligated permanently” by its 
regional commitments to Latin America.105 The U.S. delegation worried that other 
American states could take actions under Chapultepec without U.S. approval. Stettinius 
agreed, saying “while recognizing the strategic importance of inter-American solidarity, 
we should not allow ourselves to be compelled to adopt a position contrary to our own 
view of national interest.”106 Despite defense concerns, the global institutional 
advocates initially dominated.  
However, antecedents shaped the preferences of other actors, who emphasized the 
perceived benefits of layering and converting the existing institutional architecture to 
more multilateral forms. Countering Pasvolsky, Latin Americans threatened a walkout 
from San Francisco to preserve the regional system; then, Latin American diplomats 
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exploited U.S. divisions by appealing to advocates of Pan-American institutions.107 Latin 
American diplomats contacted a bedridden Hull and Rockefeller, then pressed Sen. 
Arthur Vandenburg, a delegation member, for a reference to the Chapultepec accords in 
the San Francisco treaty.108 Colombian Alberto Lleras Camargo and Cuba’s formidable 
Ambassador Guillermo Belt countered Pasvolsky, demanding a public presidential 
declaration of support for the inter-American system as embodied in Chapultepec and 
for conferences to formalize antecedents of inter-American cooperation.109 To bridge 
the divide, U.S. delegate Harold Stassen proposed a “collective self-defense” approach 
to link the global organization and regional pacts, formulated as an “inherent right of 
self-defense, either individual or collective.” The response to Latin American pressure 
led to UN Article 51.110 
Latin Americans sought to preserve and formalize hemispheric diplomatic consultation 
in a context where U.S. interests were suddenly global. Pro-regional U.S. diplomats also 
expected continued returns from inter-American cooperation. Ambassador Adolph Berle 
noted—and opposed—in October 1945 “one current of opinion which by and large 
would like to end the regional agreement which has served us well.”111 Inter-American 
“solidarity” had extended U.S. influence and dampened opposition. A memorandum to 
President Truman in late 1945 noted Latin American concerns that the new 
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administration, “[did] not realize that continental solidarity is essential from the political, 
human, and economic point of every country in the western hemisphere, including the 
United States.” However, solidarity was distinct from collective identity, which few U.S. 
policymakers shared. The same memorandum evinced condescending essentialism 
that casts doubts on a collective identity explanation. The diplomat said public 
statements “would be very welcome by the Latins. They are a touchy and emotional 
people who like to be catered to and patted on the back.”112 The language, common in 
the period, echoed longstanding tropes in U.S. foreign policymaking about Latin 
American distinctiveness and inferiority. Certain ties of history bound the United States 
and Latin America, but for most in the U.S. foreign policy elite, race, religion and social 
development created distinct identities. 
Collective security and the road to Rio 
When the United States waffled on its regional commitments at San Francisco, Latin 
Americans pressured Truman for a conference to convert antecedent defense 
agreements into formal, multilateral institutions. This led, eventually, to the 1947 Rio 
Conference and Treaty. Later seen as the encapsulation of U.S dominance, the Rio 
Treaty emerged from a Latin American diplomatic victory.  
The Rio Conference was to be held shortly after San Francisco, but worsening U.S. 
relations with Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón, including State Department attempts to 
sway Argentine elections by tying Perón to fascists, postponed the conference. Brazil 
initially endorsed the delay, as did the PAU, agreeing that Argentina had not met inter-
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American commitments and therefore could not join a conference based on them.113 
Soon, Latin American ambassadors noted “rumors” that the U.S. wanted to drop the 
regional defense pact.114 By April 1946, Brazilians began highlighting “the just 
aspirations of the American Republics to conclude the Interamerican Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance in the briefest possible period and without fracturing continental unity.”115 
During the delay, the U.S. military advocated a continental plan for weapons 
standardization and “for granting of military rights, facilities, etc. whenever military 
enforcement action was necessary”116—limited defense burden-sharing, in the U.S. 
military’s view—but many in Latin America and the State Department rejected arms 
spending as needless and dangerous.117 This rejection highlights the secondary 
importance of burden-sharing and the common perception of low external threats.  
Brazil’s first draft of the Rio Treaty in September 1945 advanced a strong version of 
inter-American security multilateralism, making responsive measures largely obligatory 
and requiring signatories to facilitate and aid the passage of collective military forces.118 
Brazilians argued against replicating the top-heavy UNSC in the Americas, as it would 
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be “contrary to the traditional bases of the Interamerican System.”119 Instead, Brazil 
favored broad-based multilateral institutions patterned after inter-American antecedents. 
Conversely, U.S. planning for Rio, initially chaired by Pasvolsky, emphasized that inter-
American responses would be “executed subject to” the UNSC.120 Article 51 had not 
ensured an autonomous regional security system.  
With the meeting finally in sight, Brazil pressed to limit the agenda to a security treaty—
with economic and other proposals delayed until the planned Bogota conference.121 
One such proposal was Mexican Foreign Minister Jaime Torres Bodet’s call for an inter-
American “constitutive charter” in April 1947. Torres Bodet noted the history of “the 
oldest regional body” and the need to modernize “a series of conventions and 
resolutions [that] can be difficult to consult and are at times of uncertain contractual 
value.”122 By the end of June, eighteen American republics expressed agreement on the 
need for a clearer, multilateral structure building on previous institutions.123 Dispute 
resolution was paramount for Mexico, which sought to layer over existing arbitration 
practices to create security institutions to curtail inter-American aggression.124 Torres 
Bodet told a U.S. audience the Rio Treaty would carry out “a noble tradition of 
 
119 Alarico Silveira Junior and Barboza Carneiro to Sr. Chefe da Comissão de Organismos Internacionais, 
Conferência Interamericana para a Manutenção da Paz e da Segurança no Continente, January 21, 
1947, L1845 M36046, AHIR. 
120 FRUS 1945, vol. 9, doc. 100. Online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v09/d100 
121 Brazilian Embassy in Mexico, Relatório do Mês Político de Abril de 1947, May 15, 1947, 32/3/9 Mexico 
Oficios 1947, AHIR. 
122 Torres Bodet, press statement, April 15, 1947, Folder, Boletines y declaraciones IX Conferencia 
Internacional Americana, III-1053-1(2), SRE-MEX. 
123 SRE, press release, June 28, 1947, Folder, Boletines y declaraciones IX Conferencia Internacional 
Americana, III-1053-1(2), SRE-MEX. 
124 Torres Bodet, speech on opening of Rio Conference, August 15, 1947, III-1053-1(2), SRE-MEX. 
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continental solidarity and common defense of the American peoples … as old as the 
independence of our Republics.”125 
Ultimately, the negotiation of the collective security agreement was rather smooth—in 
part because U.S. preferences had grown more compatible with what Latin Americans 
had advocated since 1944—greater regional autonomy. U.S.-Soviet competition played 
a role in changing U.S. preferences, but antecedents structured the range of available, 
mutually acceptable choices. By 1947, the U.S. had reduced its attachment to UNSC 
centrality and sought explicit inter-American commitments to “assist” in response to an 
attack, as opposed to just consultations.126 An attack “imposes common obligations 
immediately,” the U.S. opined—a more expansive interpretation of Article 51.127 The 
U.S. left the definition of “aggression” open to include “subversion or political attack,” in 
a nod to regional concerns about communism and wartime fears of “fifth column” 
fascists.128 The U.S. concern in Latin America remained neo-fascism in the form of 
Argentina’s Perón more than Soviet-backed revolution. During 1947, Latin Americans 
highlighted communist threats more often than their U.S. counterparts.129  
Despite pre-conference concerns that “the treaty will not bind the United States without 
its consent,”130 the United States accepted a binding two-thirds vote in the event of 
 
125 Torres Bodet, radio interview with National Broadcasting Company, September 26, 1947, III-1053-1(2), 
SRE-MEX. 
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aggression. Secretary of State Marshall internally cited the U.S. “desire to make the 
treaty as effective as possible” as the reason for bowing to Latin American 
preferences,131 expressed in the Mexican plan presented to the PAU.132 The Latin 
American majority preference for a binding solution that obligated the U.S. without a 
veto converted antecedents of sovereign equality and nonintervention to a new postwar 
context. Nineteen American nations adopted the collective defense formula on August 
30, 1947, a victory for regional arrangements under the UN framework and a precedent 
for NATO.133 
An inter-American constitution 
The Ninth International Conference of American States, held in Bogota from March 30-
May 20, 1948, was the culmination of efforts to formalize and multilateralize 
antecedents. From 1944 to 1948, several things had changed. The breakdown of U.S.-
Soviet cooperation altered the global context. U.S. concerns about international 
communism were growing, though U.S. policymakers still considered Latin America a 
secure, and secondary, zone. Despite shifting domestic politics in many Latin American 
countries, the change in inter-American security preferences was minimal; surging anti-
communism was a return to the historical norm. The Bogota conference suffered 
disruption when Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a populist Colombian presidential candidate, was 
murdered near the conference site. Riots erupted and some delegation members and 
families fled. Colombia veered into violence and turmoil, which would lead to a military 
takeover. Even so, CIA concerns about communist activities at the summit did not 
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include fears of a leftist uprising;134 the disruption did not alter the outcome of the 
proceedings.  
The Bogota conference focused on inter-American political and legal instruments that 
included and went beyond security governance. Plans for an inter-American 
constitutional order originated with Mexico’s concerns about uncertain U.S. 
commitment. Torres Bodet remained its most forceful advocate, emphasizing the need 
to build “on all of the juridical elements of Pan-Americanism that have been defined and 
refined in the light of experience.”135 Without pressing external threats and despite a 
limited ability for burden-sharing,136 U.S. and Latin American leaders sought to increase 
and institutionalize inter-American cooperation, ad hoc before the war. Mechanisms of 
layering and conversion produced rapid changes in this critical juncture.  
Brazil and Mexico sought a stronger, more independent inter-American secretariat 
where Latin Americans would have a greater voice. When Chile proposed a rotating 
council, Brazil invoked regional antecedents to oppose it as inferior because “it would 
lack the tradition, unity, means of information, etc.” Mexico concurred, saying, it “had not 
come to the conference with the motive of retreating from the conquests reached by 
Panamericanism.”137 Brazilian and Mexican preferences were shaped by the perceived 
 
134 Statement of Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter (Director, CIA) to the Special Subcommittee of the Committee 
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advantages of layering on antecedents. At Latin America’s urging, and particularly 
Mexico’s, the conference drew on antecedents for a declaration of Rights and Duties of 
American States that averred “faith in the principal of continental solidarity and 
proclaim[ed] their unshakeable loyalty to the Interamerican system.”138 The conference 
recreated previous institutions under the OAS structure and passed a treaty on dispute 
settlement as the peaceful equivalent to Rio’s security alliance.139 The new institutions 
strengthened legal restraints on unilateral intervention, while keeping the United States 
engaged in the region. 
Antecedents shaped the regional security arrangements that emerged from the postwar 
juncture, especially in the Americas where external threat and burden-sharing were 
notably absent. By shaping the range of choices and preferences, antecedents helped 
produce multilateral security institutions. Earlier experiences led Latin Americans to 
expect increasing returns from institutionalized consultation and decision-making—with 
policy feedback shaping layering.140 For the United States, building on the antecedents 
that had ensured cooperation in World War II seemed a prudent course. Layering on 
and converting existing institutions were perceived as entailing lower set-up costs and 
offering greater certainty, while limiting the range of compatible choices. Actors who had 
been engaged in antecedent cooperation formed coalitions to defend and expand it; 
they presented regional multilateralism as less costly and uncertain than alternative 
arrangements such as U.S. unilateralism or solely global security institutions. The Pan 
 
138 Draft of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the American States, Acta de la sesión 
extraordinaria del consejo directivo de la Unión Panamericana, July 17, 1946, Folder III-2313-1(7a), SRE-
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American Union, which was itself the site of conversion and layering in the new order, 
aided coordination and helped address contentious situations like Argentina’s 
participation. While antecedents could be instrumentalized in a form of rhetorical 
entrapment, they also shaped preferences, choices, and outcomes in the permissive 
conditions of the critical juncture. The often-incremental processes of layering and 
conversion took on new importance in a rapid restructuring of the inter-American system 
during the critical juncture, as diplomats reshaped previous antecedents for new 
purposes and a new context. 
Conclusions 
This article examines the emergence of multilateral security institutions in the Americas 
after World War II, despite the absence of causes highlighted in the literature. We 
empirically expand the “no NATO in Asia” debate and challenge its most influential 
conclusions. Our explanation builds on and contributes to HI scholarship by examining 
how antecedents shape institutional outcomes during critical junctures. In doing so, we 
provide new tools for understanding the emergence of regional institutions, highlighting 
how processes associated with incremental change—conversion and layering—occur 
during critical junctures. These tools contribute to a growing dialogue between HI and 
IR. The value of HI for explaining key phenomena in International Relations goes 
beyond illustrating how path dependence shapes the continuity of international 
institutions; it can help explain processes of change as well. We particularly highlight 
how better understanding the dynamics of critical junctures and mechanisms of change 
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allows scholars to systematize the treatment of history in their explanations of the 
emergence and evolution of international institutions. 
A full exploration of the creation of NATO and the failure of the proposed Pacific Pact 
and SEATO is beyond this article’s scope, and well covered in the literature.141 
However, it is worth mentioning the three regions’ distinct antecedents as they relate to 
divergence in the form of regional security arrangements. There is broad agreement on 
the absence of multilateral security arrangements in Asia during the postwar period. If 
identity and history are seen as competing, the absence of U.S.-Asian security 
multilateralism is congruent with both factors (see Table 1). In the inter-American 
system, however, identity and history diverge. The U.S. policymaker biases toward 
Asians that Hemmer and Katzenstein emphasize find echoes in paternalistic, 
patronizing, and racist views of Latin Americans in the 1940s. However, historical 
antecedents were on Latin Americans’ side. U.S. relations with Asia lacked the earlier 
structures and practices that gradually characterized U.S.-Latin American relations from 
at least the 1889 Pan-American Conference. Actors perceived the recreation of earlier 
Pan-American arrangements as beneficial, which shaped their preferences to maintain 
and expand them. U.S. historical ties with Asia were more limited and did not include 
substantial shared historical antecedents with a region heavily shaped by European 
colonialism. Asian diplomats could not appeal to antecedents, nor did they benefit from 
perceptions of shared identity. Bilateral and initially ad hoc models dominated. 
 
141 Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Acharya 2005; Press-Barnathan 2004; Beeson 2005.  
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For NATO’s emergence, both identity and antecedents support multilateralism; further 
study would be needed to untangle the two in causal processes. At a glance, 
antecedents appear important. According to one historian, NATO’s “antecedents can be 
traced back to the Knox Resolution and the abortive French security treaty of 1919.”142 
Within living memory of many policymakers, the United States and Western European 
states had cooperated in the First World War, the Paris conference of 1919, the Dawes 
Plan of 1924, and through economic—and often nominally private—cooperation in 
European post-WWI reconstruction. These events had continued importance for 
influential Atlanticists in the U.S. foreign policy establishment; even many League of 
Nations opponents favored strong trans-Atlantic defense ties.143 Despite U.S. rejection 
of the League, coordination continued in agreements such as the London Naval 
Conference. The most evident antecedents include cooperation during both world wars. 
While this may have been dominated, especially after mid-1940, by cooperation 
between Britain, the U.S., and Canada, broader antecedents exist, such as Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Trygve Lie’s 1940 proposal for North Atlantic security. Like in the 
Americas, a host of activity followed WWII but preceded NATO’s emergence.144 Brinkley 
underlines Dean Acheson’s involvement in trans-Atlantic antecedents as influential in 
shaping his approach in the North Atlantic.145 Antecedents predisposed actors to 
multilateral agreements in the critical juncture of the late 1940s and conditioned how 
they responded to a new threat, providing material for rapid institutional construction.  
 
142 Roberts 1997, 363. 
143 Ibid., esp. 348, 362. Such backers included Theodore Roosevelt and Stimson. Several prominent 
League opponents favored Anglo-American security guarantees for France and small continental states. 
144 These are emphasized in Baylis 1993; Brinkley 1992. 
145 Brinkley 1992, 131-139. 
43 
 
External threat is considered the key explanation for NATO, but it is ambiguous in 
explaining weaker U.S.-Asian multilateralism. In the Americas, collective security 
commitments emerged despite low perceptions of external threat. A 1947 CIA report 
dedicated one page to Latin America: “In Latin America Soviet objectives are limited 
and negative. …With the conclusion of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, however, United 
States interests in Latin America appear to be reasonably secure.”146 Latin Americans 
were more concerned about internal communist threats than was the Truman 
administration. In Brazil, home of the largest communist party in the region, government 
repression went against the U.S. ambassador’s advice.147 Regionally, the U.S. opposed 
formal anti-communist agreements, despite some calls from Latin America.  
While the presence of great powers to share security burdens does not explain the 
emergence of security cooperation in the Americas, it may be quite important to 
understanding subsequent institutional evolution. NATO evolved toward more 
multilateralism, though one could read too much egalitarianism backwards into its 
founding moment, when even the British depended on U.S. economic and military 
assistance.148 Baylis writes that NATO “signalled the end of British ambitions for a more 
independent world role.”149 Only later, with recovery, could the European powers 
provide some balance within multilateral NATO. U.S. commitments grew more 
expansive—an illustration of historical institutionalists’ point that institutional paths often 
 
146 CIA, Review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States, September 12, 
1947, SMOF: National Security Council File, Box 4, HSTPL. 
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149 Baylis 1993, 120. 
44 
 
diverge from founders’ intentions. On the other hand, the inter-American system drifted 
away from multilateralism in practice, though not in form, as asymmetries were 
worsened by the intensification of the Cold War.  
Our findings challenge students of regionalism to more clearly distinguish between 
broad treatments of identity and the more specific implications of historical antecedents 
of regionalism. Hemmer and Katzenstein’s explanation highlights collective identity, and 
it is reasonable to ask whether historical antecedents are just a component of identity. 
Certainly, collective identity relates to history. However, our explanation emphasizes 
something more specific. The United States had history with China and Japan, for 
example, but none of it constituted a shared historical antecedent of regionalism. 
Possibilities for rapid layering or conversion were minimal. When questions of global 
and regional order were thrown open for renegotiation after WWII, the presence of 
historical antecedents shaped the range of feasible choices and favored divergent 
outcomes in different regions. Pan-American institutions, summits, and practices served 
as important models. The PAU offered a focal point, a physical site, and established 
procedures for discussions between Latin American and U.S. diplomats. Many Latin 
Americans perceived benefits from deepening and expanding regional cooperation in a 
new global context. At the 1947 Rio conference, Colombian Lleras Camargo “made an 
extensive comparison between the inter-American system and UN pointing out that UN 
is only experiment and weak, experiencing ‘continuous friction with reality, very similar 
in appearance to failure.’”150 Antecedents had provided important benefits to the United 
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States, too, giving the country legitimacy, a geostrategic reserve, and close commercial 
ties. Many U.S. and Latin American actors alike expected continued benefits.  
The case, crucial to inter-American institutional creation, should invite greater reflection 
on the nature of early Cold War U.S. hegemony in the Americas, which is often treated 
as monolithic, “crudely imperial,” and therefore of secondary importance to 
understanding the emergence of U.S.-led international orders.151 Though the possibility 
of coercion cast a shadow, inter-American order was also characterized by negotiated 
bargains that incorporated Latin American leaders’ interests, even at the height of U.S. 
power. In the postwar critical juncture, Latin American diplomats, and some supportive 
U.S. policymakers, drew on antecedents to shape and advance plans for multilateral 
security institutions. These included mechanisms of restraint. Despite many Latin 
Americans’ concerns about its ultimately interventionist nature, Latin American 
diplomats cited the Monroe Doctrine and U.S.-led Pan Americanism in support of a 
grand bargain that would extend and institutionalize U.S. engagement while restricting 
unilateralism.152 In earlier summits, the American states had committed themselves to 
juridical equality, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, and diplomatic 
consultation. Now, they refashioned earlier institutions and formalized those 
commitments. U.S. adherence to these principles would remain incomplete in the new 
inter-American system, as it always had been. Latin Americans realized that. However, 
in a variation of Lord Ismay’s quip about NATO, the inter-American system remained 
 
151 Ikenberry 2012, 27. 
152 Though the Monroe Doctrine was later viewed almost universally in Latin America as interventionist, 
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Latin America’s best bet to keep the United States in (regional politics), out (of internal 
affairs), and down (proscribed from intervening), all at once.  
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